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Abstract
Liquidation is the process of selling a large num-
ber of shares of one stock sequentially within a
given time frame, taking into consideration the
costs arising from market impact and a trader’s
risk aversion. The main challenge in optimiz-
ing liquidation is to find an appropriate modeling
system that can incorporate the complexities of
the stock market and generate practical trading
strategies. In this paper, we propose to use multi-
agent deep reinforcement learning model, which
better captures high-level complexities compar-
ing to various machine learning methods, such
that agents can learn how to make best selling
decisions. First, we theoretically analyze the Alm-
gren and Chriss model and extend its fundamental
mechanism so it can be used as the multi-agent
trading environment. Our work builds the foun-
dation for future multi-agent environment trading
analysis. Secondly, we analyze the cooperative
and competitive behaviors between agents by ad-
justing the reward functions for each agent, which
overcomes the limitation of single-agent reinforce-
ment learning algorithms. Finally, we simulate
trading and develop optimal trading strategy with
practical constraints by using reinforcement learn-
ing method, which shows the capabilities of rein-
forcement learning methods in solving realistic
liquidation problems.
1. Introduction
Liquidation, as one kind of stock trading, is one of the main
functions of financial institutes, and the ability to minimize
selling cost and manage risk level would be a key indicator
of their financial performance. Therefore, effective trading
strategy is of great importance. Financial institutes are up-
dating their strategies recently, by making use of advanced
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Figure 1. Liquidation: multiple agents sell stocks in the market,
and their selling decisions would affect each others’ selling cost
research results or cutting-edge technologies. However,
there are several challenges. First, liquidation of a large
number of stock shares would have huge impact on the mar-
ket, making the environment difficult to predict. Secondly,
current methods for static environment ignore the dynamic
and interactive nature of the stock market. Thirdly, the trad-
ing cost of liquidation depends on the stock market, and
researchers are usually not able to collect enough historical
events data to obtain practical trading insights.
Financial modeling and machine learning are two popular
approaches in developing trading strategies, but both of
them have limitations. For the past years, financial insti-
tutes rely on experienced traders to minimize trading cost
and manage liquidation risk. Also, researchers build math-
ematical and financial models to help develop liquidation
strategies (Gomber et al., 2011; Brogaard et al., 2010). How-
ever, mathematical and financial modelling methods rely on
their assumptions, which usually over-simplify the problem.
Most recently, researchers started to adopt machine learning
methods as well.
Reinforcement learning (RL), one type of machine learning
methods, consists of agents interacting with the environment
to learn an optimal policy by trail and error for sequential
decision-making problems (Sutton & Barto, 2018; Van Has-
selt et al., 2016). While most of the successes of RL have
been in the single agent domain, where modelling or pre-
dicting the behavior of other actors in the environment is not
considered, the obtained trading strategy (Xiong et al., 2018)
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ignores the stochastic and interactive nature of the trading
market. A more general scenario would be that multiple
organizations or customers want to liquidate their assets
under certain market conditions at the same time. Therefore,
the trading market would have multiple players or institutes
with similar objectives (Bansal et al., 2017; Tampuu et al.,
2017), and the behavior of one agent would affect other
agents’ behaviors (Yang et al., 2018b), as shown in Fig 1.
Another scenario would be even if there is only one com-
pany working on the liquidation of one stock, but still there
could be multiple traders and each of them be responsible
for a certain percentage of shares to sell.
This calls for the demand of applying multi-agent reinforce-
ment learning methods to the financial industry, which has
not been well-studied as much as single-agent reinforce-
ment learning. There are attractive successes of multi-agent
deep reinforcement learning in the fields of gaming playing
(Silver et al., 2016; Mnih et al., 2015), robotics and finan-
cial trading system (Yu et al., 2019; Buehler et al., 2019).
The main benefit of using reinforcement learning for liqui-
dation is that mathematical models or hard-coded trading
strategies can be avoided. Reinforcement learning agent
would learn the trading strategy on its own. In addition,
a simulated environment would allow agents to adapt to
different market conditions and trade stocks, and obtain far
more experience than human traders could obtain in real
financial market (Schaul et al., 2015; Foerster et al., 2017).
Last but not the least, multi-agent reinforcement learning
algorithms can take into account high-level environment
complexities (Hendricks & Wilcox, 2014) and derive more
practical liquidation strategies accordingly.
The main contribution of this paper is the analysis of the
multi-agent trading environment, the impact analysis of co-
ordinated relationship between agents, and the derivation
of liquidation strategies. Ideally, if the multi-agent environ-
ment is complex enough to incorporate all potential players’
behaviors, there would be no noise in the stock market, as all
orders are generated by players, and all players’ behaviors
are modelled systematically by the multi-agent system. We
build a simplified version of the multi-agent environment,
which is the foundation of more complicated environments.
First, we extend the model proposed by Almgren and Chriss
(Almgren & Chriss, 2001) to the multi-agent environment
and provide mathematical proofs. We make use of reinforce-
ment learning to verify our theorems and conclude with the
necessity to use multi-agent reinforcement learning instead
of conventional single-agent reinforcement learning algo-
rithms to analyze the liquidation problem. Secondly, we
demonstrate how agents learn to cooperate or compete with
each other by defining proper reward functions, analyze how
these agents influence each other as well as the environment
as a whole, which cannot be analyzed by a single-agent
environment, but of great importance to financial institutes.
Thirdly, we derive trading strategies for each agent in a
simulated multi-agent environment. This demonstrates the
capabilities of reinforcement learning algorithms in learning
and developing practical liquidation strategies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
2 describes the liquidation problem and reviews the Alm-
gren and Chriss model that is used to simulate the market
environment. Section 3 introduces the detailed settings of
multi-agent reinforcement learning. Section 4 is about the
extension of the multi-agent market environment. Section
5 presents the experimental results where we demonstrate
how agents would behave in cooperative or competitive re-
lationships and how to derive liquidation strategy. Section 6
concludes this paper and points out some future direction.
Code is available at: https://github.com/WenhangBao/Multi-
Agent-RL-for-Liquidation
2. Problem Description
In this section, we first describe the liquidation problem
and explain why it is feasible to use reinforcement learning
algorithms to address it. Then we describe the Almgren and
Chriss model or the trading environment.
2.1. Optimal Liquidation Problem
We consider a liquidation trader who aims to sell X shares
of one stock within a time frame T . Liquidator’s personal
characteristics, such as risk aversion level λ, would remain
unchanged throughout the process. The trader can either sell
or not sell stocks, but cannot buy any stock during the time
frame T . On the last day of the time frame, the liquidation
process ends and the number of shares should be 0. Since
the trading volume is tremendous, the market price P will
drop during selling, temporarily or permanently, potentially
resulting in enormous trading costs.
The trader or the representative financial institute seeks to
find an optimal selling strategy, minimizing the expected
trading cost E(X), or called implementation shortfall, sub-
ject to certain optimization criterion. The trader would know
all the environment information includes price, historical
price and number of trading days remaining. If there are
J traders, they would not know other traders’ information.
For instance, they would not know other traders’ remaining
shares or risk aversion levels.
Based on the assumption that the trading would have market
impacts as well as that agents and environment are inter-
active, it is feasible to train agents in the environment and
derive liquidation strategies with reinforcement learning
algorithms (Yang et al., 2018a).
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2.2. Environment Model for the Simulation
The problem of an optimal liquidation strategy is investi-
gated by using the Almgren-Chriss market impact model
(Almgren & Chriss, 2001) on the background that the agents
liquidate assets completely in a given time frame. The im-
pact of the stock market is divided into three components:
unaffected price process, permanent impact, and temporary
impact. The stochastic component of the price process ex-
ists, but is eliminated from the mean-variance. The price
process permits linear functions of permanent and temporary
price. Therefore, the model serves as the trading environ-
ment such that when agents make selling decisions, the
environment would return price information.
The price process of the Almgren and Chriss model (Alm-
gren & Chriss, 2001) is as follows:
• Price under temporary and permanent impact
Pk = Pk−1 + στ1/2ξk − τg(nk
τ
), k = 1, . . . , N
where σ represents the volatility of the stock, ξk are
random variables with zero mean and unit variance,
g(v) is a function of the average rate of the trading,
v = nk/τ during time interval tk−1 to tk, nk is the
number of shares to sell during time interval tk−1 to
tk, N is the total number of trades and τ = T/N .
• Inventory process: xtk = X −
∑k
j=1 nj , where xtk
is the number of shares remaining at time tk, with
xT = 0.
• Linear permanent impact function g(v) = γv, where
v = nkτ .
• Temporary impact function h(nkτ ) =  sgn(nk)+ ητ nk,
where a reasonable estimate of  is the fixed costs of
selling, and η depends on internal and transient aspects
of the market micro-structure.
• Parameters σ, γ, η, , time frame T , number of trades
N are set at t = 0.
3. Deep Reinforcement Learning Approach
We model the liquidation process as a Markov decision
process (MDP), and then formulate the multi-agent setting
we used to resolve the problem. The training diagram is also
covered, which explains how multiple agents interact and
learn from environment in details. We use implementation
shortfall as the metric of selling cost, and the properties of
MDP process allows us to define the goal as minimizing the
expected implementation shortfall.
3.1. Liquidation as a MDP Problem
Consider the stochastic and interactive nature of the trading
market, we model the stock trading process as a Markov
decision process, which is specified as follows:
• State s = [r,m, l]: a set that includes the information
of the log-return r ∈ RD+ , where D is the number
of days of log-return, and the remaining number of
trades m normalized by the total number of trades, the
remaining number of shares l, normalized by the total
number of shares. The log-returns capture information
about stock prices before time tk, where k is the current
step. It is important to note that in real world trading
scenarios, this state vector may hold more variables.
• Action a: we interpret the action ak as a selling frac-
tion. In this case, the actions will take continuous
values in between 0 and 1.
• Reward R(s, a): to define the reward function, we use
the difference between two consecutive utility func-
tions. The utility function is given by:
U(x) = E(x) + λV (x), (1)
E(x) =
N∑
k=1
τxkg(
nk
τ
) +
N∑
k=1
nkh(
nk
τ
), (2)
V (x) = σ2
N∑
k=1
τx2k, (3)
where λ is the risk aversion level, and x is the trading
trajectory or the vector of shares remaining at each time
step k, 0 ≤ tk ≤ T . After each time step, we compute
the utility using the equations forE(x) and V (x) from
the Almgren and Chriss model for the remaining time
and inventory while holding parameter λ constant. De-
notes the optimal trading trajectory computed at time t
by x∗t , we define the reward as:
Rt = Ut(x
∗
t )− Ut+1(x∗t+1). (4)
• Policy pi(s): The liquidation strategy of stocks at state
s. It is essentially the distribution of selling percentage
a at state s.
• Action-value function Qpi(s, a): the expected reward
achieved by action a at state s, following policy pi.
3.2. Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning Setting
The advantages of multi-agent over single-agent reinforce-
ment learning is the ability to incorporate high-level com-
plexities in the system. The single-agent environment is a
special case where the number of agents J = 1. It simplifies
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the problem and would automatically inherit all properties
from the multi-agent environment. Following the MDP con-
figuration in the last section, we specify our multi-agent
reinforcement learning setting as follows:
• States s = [r,m, l] : in a multi-agent environment,
the state vector should have information about the re-
maining stocks of each agent. Therefore, in a J agents
environment, the state vector at time tk would be:
[rk−D, . . . , rk−1, rk,mk, l1,k, . . . , lJ,k],
where
– rk = log( PkPk−1 ) is the log-return at time tk.
– mk = NkN is the number of trades remaining at
time tk normalized by the total number of trades.
– lj,k =
xj,k
Xj
is the remaining number of shares for
agent j at time tk normalized by the total number
of shares.
• Action a: using the interpretation in Section 3.1, we
can determine the number of shares to sell for each at
each time step using:
nj,k = aj,k × xj,k,
where xj,k is the number of remaining shares at time
tk for agent j.
• Reward R(s, a): denotes the optimal trading trajectory
computed at time t for agent j by x∗j,t, we define the
reward as:
Rj,t = Uj,t(x
∗
j,t)− Uj,t+1(x∗j,t+1). (5)
• Observation O: Each agent only observes limited state
information (Omidshafiei et al., 2017). In other words,
in addition to the environment information, each agent
only knows its own remaining shares, but not other
agents’ remaining shares. The observation vector at
time tk for agent j is:
Oj,k = [rk−D, . . . , rk−1, rk,mk, lj,k].
3.3. Deep Reinforcement Learning Algorithm
We adopt the Actor-Critic (Mnih et al., 2016; Lowe et al.,
2017) method that uses neural networks to approximate both
the Q-value and the action. The critic learns the Q-value
function and uses it to update actor’s policy parameters. The
critic network estimates the expected return of a state-action
pair. The actor brings the advantage of computing continu-
ous actions without the need of a Q-value function, while
the critic supplies the actor with knowledge of the perfor-
mance. The actor network has state s as input and returns
action a directly. Actor-critic methods usually have good
convergence properties, in contrast to critic-only methods.
Algorithm 1 DDPG-Based Multi-agent Training
Input: number of episodes M , time frame T , minibatch
size N , learning rate λ, and number of agents J
1: for j = 1, J % initialize each agent separately do
2: Randomly initialize critic networkQj(Oj , a|θQj ) and
actor network µj(Oj |θµj )with random weight θQj and
θµj for agent j;
3: Initialize target network Q′j and µ
′
j with weights
θQ
′
j ← θQj , θµ
′
j ← θµj for each agent j;
4: Initialize replay buffer Bj for each agent j;
5: end for
6: for episode = 1,M do
7: Initialize a random process N for action exploration;
8: Receive initial observation state s0;
9: for t = 1, T do
10: for j = 1, J %train each agent separately do
11: Select action aj,t = µj(Oj,t|θµj )+Nt according
to the current policy and exploration noise;
12: end for
13: Each agent executes action aj,t;
14: Market state changes to st+1;
15: Each agent observes reward rj,t and observation
Oj,t+1;
16: for j = 1, J do
17: Store transition (Oj,t, aj,t, rj,t, Oj,t+1) in Bj ;
18: Sample a random minibatch of N transitions
(Oj,i , aj,i , rj,i , Oj,i+1) from Bj ;
19: Set
yj,i = rj,i + γQ
′
j(st+1, µ
′
j(Oj,i+1|θµ
′
j |θQ
′
j ))
for i = 1, . . . , N ;
20: Update the critic by minimizing the loss: L =
1
N
∑
i(yj,i −Qj(Oj,i, aj,i|θQj ))2;
21: Update the actor policy by using the sampled
policy gradient:
∇θµpi ≈ 1
N
∑
i
∇aQj(O, a|θQj )|O=Oj,i,a=µj(Oj,i)
×∇θµµj(Oj |θµ)|si ;
22: Update the target networks:
θQ
′
j ← τθQj + (1− τ)θQ
′
j ,
θµ
′
j ← τθµj + (1− τ)θµ
′
j .
23: end for
24: end for
25: end for
The Deep Deterministic Policy Gradients (DDPG) algo-
rithm (Lillicrap et al., 2016) is one example of an actor-
critic method. We will use DDPG to generate the optimal
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execution strategy of liquidation. DDPG uses three skills
to make sure it gets converged experimental results: ex-
perience replay buffer, learning rate and exploration noise.
Experienced replay method (Wang et al., 2016) enables the
stochastic gradient decent method and removes correlations
between consecutive transitions. Learning rate controls the
updating speed of the neural network. Exploration noise
addresses the exploration and exploitation trade-off. With
these training skills, the agent would learn from trail and
error and find the optimal trading trajectory that minimizes
the trading cost. In other words, we will use the DDPG al-
gorithm or Alg. 1 to solve the optimal liquidation problem.
4. Performance Analysis
Here we extend the classical environment model to multi-
agent scenario for liquidation problem analysis.
4.1. Optimal Multi-agent Liquidation Shortfall
Theorem 4.1. In a multi-agent environment with J agents
where each agent has Xj shares to sell within a given time
frame T , the total expected shortfall is larger than or equal
to the sum of expected shortfall that these agents would
obtain if they are in single-agent environment, such that:
J∑
j=1
E(Xj) ≤ E(
J∑
j=1
Xj), (6)
where E(X) is the expected implementation shortfall of
liquidating X shares of a stock.
Proof. According to the Almgren and Chriss model,
(namely, equation (20) in (Almgren & Chriss, 2001)), the
optimal expected shortfall is:
E(X) =
1
2
γX2 + X + η˜φX2, (7)
where X is the initial stock size and φ is a parameter related
with environment setting but unrelated with the stock size
X .
Therefore,
E(
J∑
j=1
Xj) =
1
2
γ(
J∑
j=1
Xj)
2 + 
J∑
j=1
Xj + η˜(
J∑
j=1
Xj)
2φ
≥ 1
2
γ
J∑
j=1
X2j + 
J∑
j=1
Xj + η˜
J∑
j=1
X2j φ
=
J∑
j=1
E(Xj).
4.2. Multi-agent Interaction
Theorem 4.2. In a two-agent environment where agent 1
has risk aversion level λ1 and agent 2 has risk aversion
level λ2, where λ1 6= λ2, and each of them has the same
number of stocks to liquidate, the biased trajectories x(λ1)
and x(λ2) would satisfy that
x∗(λ1) 6= x(λ1), x∗(λ2) 6= x(λ2),
where x∗(λ1) and x∗(λ2) are the optimal trading trajecto-
ries when they are the only player in the market.
Remark. In a multi-agent environment where each agent
has risk aversion level λj , the actual trading trajectory
x(λj) would be biased against the optimal trading trajec-
tory.
Proof. According to (4) of the Almgren and Chriss model
(Almgren & Chriss, 2001),
V (x) = σ2
N∑
k=1
τx2k
is irrelevant to either temporary or permanent price changes,
where xk is the remaining shares remaining at time tk. The
optimal trading trajectory is of the form:
xk =
sinh(κ(λ)(T − tj)
sinh(κ(λ)T )
X,
where κ(λ) = λσ
2
η(1− γτ2η ) .
Let X be the total stock size and agent 1 and 2 each has 12X
shares, the utility function
U(x) = E(x) + λ∗V (x)
is a quadratic function of the parameters x1, . . . , xN−1,
where λ∗ is the synthesized risk aversion level, x is the
trading trajectory, and it could also be written as:
U(x) = E(x) + λ1V (x1) + λ2V (x2),
where x1,x2 is the trading trajectory for agent 1, 2, respec-
tively. Then:
∂U
∂xk
= 2τ
{
(
λ1 + λ2
2
)σ2xk − η˜ xk−1 − 2xk + xk+1
τ2
}
,
and ∂U∂xk = 0 is equivalent to
1
τ2
(xk−1 − 2xk + xk+1) = (κ˜∗)2xk (8)
with
κ˜∗ =
(λ1+λ2)
2 σ
2
η(1− γτ2η )
,
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where the tilde denotes an O(τ) correction; as τ → 0, we
have κ˜→ κ. Then, we know that the solution to (8) is:
xk =
sinh(κ∗(T − tk))
sinh(κT )
X
6= sinh(κ(λ1)(T − tk))
sinh(κ(λ1)T )
1
2
X +
sinh(κ(λ2)(T − tk))
sinh(κ(λ2)T )
1
2
X,
where the right-hand side is the total number of remaining
shares at time t if both agents follow their original trading
trajectories, and that is not equal to the total remaining
shares at time t under optimal trading trajectory, which is
the left-hand side of the function. In other words, their new
trading trajectories would be biased.
5. Performance Evaluation
We first describe the simulation environment in details, and
then verify the Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2 by exper-
iments. We then use reinforcement learning methods to
demonstrate how agents learn to cooperate or compete with
each other by defining proper reward functions, and analyze
how the relationship would influence each individual player
as well as the environment. Finally, we derive practical
trading strategies in a multi-agent environment.
We implement a typical reinforcement learning workflow to
train the actor and critic. We change the single-agent Alm-
gren and Chriss model (Almgren & Chriss, 2001) settings to
build the multi-agent environment. We adjust reward func-
tions to manipulate agents’ relationships. We use Alg. 1 to
find a policy that can generate the optimal trading trajectory
with minimum implementation shortfall. We feed the states
observed from our simulator to each agent. These agents
first predict actions using the actor model and perform these
actions in the environment. Then, environment returns their
rewards and new states. This process continues for a given
number of episodes.
5.1. Simulation Environment
This environment simulates stock prices that follow a dis-
crete arithmetic random walk, and that the permanent and
temporary market impact functions are linear functions of
the rate of trading, as in the Almgren and Chriss model
(Almgren & Chriss, 2001).
We set the total number of shares to 1 million and the initial
stock price to be P0 = 50, which gives an initial portfolio
value of $50million dollars. The stock price has 12% annual
volatility, a bid-ask spread of 1/8, the difference between
ask price and bid price, and an average daily trading volume
of 5 million shares. Assuming that there are 250 trading
days in a year, this gives a daily volatility in stock price of
0.12/
√
250 ≈ 0.8% . We use a liquidation time frame of
T = 60 days and we set the number of trades N = 60. This
leads to τ = TN = 1 , which means that we will be making
one trade per day. These settings are changeable and can be
adjusted to same day liquidation as well.
For the temporary cost function, we set the fixed cost of
selling to be 1/2 of the bid-ask spread, so  = 1/16. We set
η such that for each one percent of the daily volume we trade,
the price impact equals to the bid-ask spread. For example,
trading at a rate of 5% of the daily trading volume incurs a
one-time cost on each trade of 5/8. Under this assumption
we have η = (1/8)/(0.01× 5× 106) = 2.5× 106.
For the permanent costs, a common rule of thumb is that
price effects become significant when we sell 10% of the
daily volume. Here, by ”significant” we mean that the
price depression is one bid-ask spread, and that the effect
is linear for both smaller and larger trading rates, then we
have γ = (1/8)/(0.1× 5× 106) = 2.5× 107.
In all our experiments, we run the program for 10000
episodes, unless it is specified. Also, we use the follow-
ing reward definition:
R˜j,t =
Uj,t(x
∗
j,t)− Uj,t+1(x∗j,t+1)
Uj,t(x∗j,t)
, (9)
which normalizes the reward.
5.2. Theorem Verification
5.2.1. OPTIMAL LIQUIDATION SHORTFALL
We first train one agent A who would need to liquidate 1
million shares of a stock. Then we train two agents B1
and B2 who have the same targets and X1, X2 = 0.3, 0.7
million shares, respectively. Agents A, B1 and B2 have the
same risk aversion level λA = λB1 = λB2 = 1e−6. As we
can see from Fig. 2, the expected implementation shortfall
E(A) is larger than the sum of E(B1) and E(B2).
This result justifies Theorem 4.1. The intuition behind The-
orem 4.1 and Equation 7 is that the total expected shortfall
increases faster than the total number of stock shares.
5.2.2. MULTI-AGENT INTERACTION
Here we would like to analyze the trading trajectory of two
agents, or Theorem 4.2 as an illustration. We first train
agent A1 with risk aversion level λA1 = 1e− 4 and agent
A2 with risk aversion level λA2 = 1e − 9. Both A1 and
A2 are trained separately in a single-agent environment.
Then we train agent B1 and B2 with risk aversion level
λB1 = 1e− 4, λB2 = 1e− 9, respectively, in a two-agent
environment. All these agents have the same goal as defined
in Section 3. The trading trajectories of A1, A2, B1, B2 are
shown in Fig. 3.
Comparing to the single-agent environment, we can see that
the trading trajectory of B1 and B2 are biased. Unlike the
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Figure 2. Comparison of expected implementation shortfalls: there
are three agents A,B1 and B2. The expected shortfall of agent A
is higher than the sum of two expected shortfalls B1 and B2.
Figure 3. Trading trajectory: comparing to their original trading
trajectories, their current trading trajectories are closer to each
other when they are trained in a multi-agent environment.
single-agent scenario, where they can sell their shares inde-
pendently, now they have to take into consideration of other
players in the market. The selling patterns of other agents
would affect their liquidation strategy. The results not only
justify Remark 4.2 and Theorem 4.2, it also demonstrates
the necessity of using multi-agents reinforcement learning
algorithm to derive trading strategy. All traders are influenc-
ing each other when they are executing their own strategy.
Therefore, training one agent in a single-agent environment
over-simplifies the stochastic and dynamic nature of the
stock market, as we have explained in Section 1.
5.3. Multi-agent Coordinated Relationship
To analyze the emergence of a variety of coordinated be-
haviors, we adjust the rewarding schemes to change the
relationship between agents. There are only two agents in
this environment for illustration purpose. Each agent would
be responsible for selling 0.5 million shares of a stock. They
share the same risk aversion level λ = 1e − 6. The only
difference between the next two experiments is the defini-
tion of the reward functions. Then we compare the sum
of expected shortfalls with the expected shortfall trained
independently, to evaluate how the relationship would affect
the total as well as individual implementation shortfalls.
Figure 4. Cooperative and competitive relationships: if two agents
are in cooperative relationship, the total expected shortfall is not
better than training with independent reward functions. If two
agents are in a competitive relationship, they would first learn to
minimize expected shortfall, and then malignant competition leads
to significant implementation shortfall increment.
5.3.1. MULTI-AGENTS COOPERATION
In this setting we want to analyze how agents would behave
when they are in a cooperative relationship. Therefore, we
adjust the reward function as follows:
R˜∗1,t = R˜
∗
2,t =
R˜1,t + R˜2,t
2
, (10)
where R˜∗j,t are the new reward functions.
Both agents would be rewarded by the sum of their individ-
ual rewards. So the two agents would be fully cooperative
to minimize implementation shortfall. The result is shown
in Fig. 4. First, we notice that the sum of expected shortfall
does not change much comparing to training two agents with
reward function R˜j,t. Secondly, new individual implemen-
tation shortfall E∗(x∗j ) does not change much comparing
to the original implementation shortfall E(x∗j ), where x
∗
j is
the optimal trading trajectory.
5.3.2. MULTI-AGENTS COMPETITION
In this setting we want to analyze how agents would behave
when they are in a competitive relationship. Therefore, we
adjust the reward function as follows:
if R˜1,t > R˜2,t then
R˜∗1,t = R˜1,t,
R˜∗2,t = R˜2,t − R˜1,t,
else
R˜∗2,t = R˜2,t,
R˜∗1,t = R˜1,t − R˜2,t,
end if
where R˜∗j,t are the new reward functions.
In this case, the agent that gets higher reward would keep
it, but the agent with lower reward would be penalized. It
would receive reward value equal to its original reward mi-
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Figure 5. Trading trajectory: comparing to independent training,
introducing a competitor makes the host agent learn to adapt to
new environment and sell all shares of stock in the first two days.
nus the higher reward, which is a negative value. As we can
see from Fig. 4 that the sum of expected shortfalls ends up
with about twice as they are independent or in cooperative re-
lationship. By looking at the snapshot of trading trajectory at
1500 episode and 10000 episode, we notice that at the 1500
episode, these two agents learn to maximize utility func-
tion defined in Section 3.1. Both agents perform well and
roughly have the same expected shortfall. However, as they
are in a competitive relationship, after another 500 episodes
of training, one agent learns to ourperform the other, which
leads to the significant increment of the sum of expected
shortfall, or
∑2
j=1E
∗(x∗j ) >
∑2
j=1E(x
∗
j ). The trading
trajectory of the last episode shows that one agent learns
to sell all its shares on Day 1. In addition, the expected
shortfall for both agents increase, or E∗(x∗j ) > E(x
∗
j ).
We conclude that not only their overall performance is di-
minished, their individual performance is worse as well.
None of them is winning from their mutual competition.
5.4. Liquidation Strategy Development
We use reinforcement learning algorithm to develop trading
strategies, given the trading trajectories of the competitors.
Here we introduce an agent who has 0.5 million shares of
stocks to sell and has risk aversion level λ = 1e − 9. We
have already seen in Fig. 3 that the optimal trading trajectory
for such agent would be a straight line, which means it sells
a fixed amount of stocks everyday.
We train an agent who has another 0.5 million shares of
stocks to sell with risk aversion level λ = 1e− 6. For com-
parison purpose, we also draw the optimal trading trajectory
when the agent is trained independently in a single-agent
environment. As we can see in Fig. 5, if there is no com-
petitor, the optimal trajectory shows that the agent would
complete the liquidation process in about 20 days. After we
introduced the competitor, the trading trajectory completely
changed. Now the agent sells all its shares within the first 2
days. The agent learns to avoid taking unnecessary risk by
selling all shares in a quite short time, and let the competitor
agent to bear the execution cost of price drop.
6. Conclusion and Future Work
6.1. Contributions
We have shown the single-agent environment over-simplifies
the dynamic as well as the interactive nature of the stock
market. All orders are generated by individual traders, and
these traders act as game players, especially for a systematic
trading problem like liquidation.
In the present work, we extended the scope of Almgren
and Chriss model (Almgren & Chriss, 2001) and used re-
inforcement learning method to verify it, which setups the
foundation of the multi-agent trading environment. We illus-
trate the demand to use multi-agent environments to develop
trading strategies. We analyze how fully cooperative and
competitive relationship would affect the total and individ-
ual implementation shortfalls, respectively. We conclude
that cooperative relationship is not better than independent
one, and competitive relationship would hurt the overall and
individual performance. Finally, we demonstrate the capa-
bility of reinforcement learning agent and derived optimal
liquidation strategy for the host agent against its competitor.
6.2. Limitations
As the goal of this paper is to analyze the environment and
agents interaction, we keep simple setting as long as it is
reasonable. Therefore, we did not build more complex neu-
ral network architectures, and our best expected shortfall
after 10000 episodes of training is roughly 20% higher than
the optimal expected shortfall derived by the Almgren and
Chriss model (Almgren & Chriss, 2001). We can add more
dynamic factors in the state vector. Also, advanced back-
ground models other than Amlgren and Chriss model could
also be considered. While all these methods could poten-
tially improve this work, we believe that at this moment they
are not necessary for describing the nature of multi-agent
trading environments and analyzing agents’ behaviors, for
this preliminary analysis of liquidation problem.
6.3. Future Work
Development of more realistic trading environment, includ-
ing more dynamic factors such as news, general strategy
and legal complaints, would make great contributions to
financial analysis. A potential extension is the study of
stock liquidation by considering the optimistic bull or pes-
simistic bear (Li et al., 2019b) or the anomaly events (Li
et al., 2019a). A potential application would be using pre-
dicted agents’ behaviors to predict stock price movements,
say LSTM (Li et al., 2019a).
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